

KANDAHAR AIRFIELD  
HEADQUARTERS  
AFGHANISTAN



QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL  
DU COMMANDEMENT  
AÉRIENNE KANDAHAR  
AFGHANISTAN

NATO/J5/J3

12 December 07

TO: AS REQUIRED

SUBJECT: COMKAF'S MINIMUM RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION FOR SLEEPING ACCOMMODATION AT KAF

1. In the past there was very little regulation of construction on KAF. Nations and organisations erected structures that often failed to include sufficient blast/fragmentation protection to mitigate the IDF threat<sup>1</sup>. Many of these legacy structures, including areas of sleeping accommodation, remain poorly protected. All proposals for new structures on unit now have to be passed through the Base Camp Planning Board (BCPB). The FP Wg is represented on the BCPB and makes an assessment of any build proposal in terms of blast/fragmentation protection<sup>2</sup>. In order to aid the FP Wg representative in commenting on a build proposal for new sleeping accommodation, COMKAF's minimum recommended standards for blast/fragmentation protection have been identified<sup>3</sup>. These are detailed below.

2. The following minimum recommended standards would not mitigate the threat posed by a direct hit but would protect occupants of accommodation from the blast/fragmentation caused by a near miss:

a. Single storey sleeping accommodation is either constructed to provide blast/fragmentation protection by design, or is surrounded on all sides<sup>4</sup> by adequate protection<sup>5</sup> which is sufficiently thick to stop fragmentation and is a minimum of 1.5 metres high<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Detailed analysis of KAF's vulnerability to IDF can be provided on request to personnel holding the requisite security clearances.

<sup>2</sup> COMKAF reviews each proposal, and the BCPB's recommendation, before deciding whether to approve the proposal.

<sup>3</sup> These standards were identified following detailed review by COMKAF FP and the COMKAF Chief Engineer. The findings of this review were presented to COMKAF at NATO/J5/J3 dated 31 Oct 07.

<sup>4</sup> To be no more than 2 metres from the exterior of the building.

<sup>5</sup> Protection could constitute concrete, HESCO Bastion (or similar), sandbags, metallic barriers, earth filled ISO containers or water barriers, suitably sized and filled to address the threat.

<sup>6</sup> This is sufficient to ensure that average size personnel standing inside the accommodation do not get hit by fragmentation from an IDF round that detonates at ground level on the far side of the protection.

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- b. Multi-story sleeping accommodation is **not** recommended. If multi-storey buildings are constructed, then the whole building should provide blast/fragmentation protection by design.
- c. Individual accommodation blocks/tents are provided with dedicated blast/fragmentation protection (as opposed to enclosing several blocks/tents within one protective wall).
- d. Windows are kept to a minimum. Where installed, 6.8mm laminated glass is the minimum recommended requirement<sup>7</sup> to mitigate the shatter hazard.
- e. Construction of blast/fragmentation for legacy sleeping accommodation should be prioritised so that the protection orientated towards the prevailing IDF threat is erected first.

3. In the event of IDF attack, the enforcement of the above minimum requirements may save life and prevent injury. Given the current enemy tactic of launching individual or small numbers of rockets against KAF, it is unlikely that personnel would reach bunkers prior to the cessation of an attack. Therefore, unless enemy tactics change, they are unlikely to save life.

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<sup>7</sup> Recommended by the May 07 JFC HQ Brüssel FP Survey.